Understanding the U.S. Trade Representative's Port-Entry Fees on China-Linked Vessels
On April 17, 2025, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (the “USTR”) published its Section 301 Action on China’s Targeting of the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors for Dominance (the “Action”).[1] The Action is the culmination of the USTR’s year-long investigation, begun under the Biden Administration, and its resulting determination pursuant to Sections 301(b) and 304(a) of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974, as amended (the “Act”),[2] that China’s targeting of the maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors for dominance is unreasonable and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and thus is actionable under Section 301(b) of the Act.[3] That determination led the USTR to publish its proposed action on February 21, 2025 (the “Proposed Action”),[4] and after two days of public hearings and hundreds of written comments,[5] to publish the Action.
The Proposed Action and subsequent public comments were the subject of an article written by the authors that appeared in the April 2025 edition of this Newsletter. A copy of the article may be found by following this link.
With the U.S. port-entry service fees imposed by the Action to begin on October 14, 2025, ship operators and owners are scrambling to understand the Action and its implications, which in many respects remain unclear.
The USTR’s Section 301 Action on China’s Targeting of the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors for Dominance
The USTR’s Action appears to differ significantly from its Proposed Action, perhaps as a result of Executive Order 14269 on “Restoring America’s Maritime Dominance” (“Executive Order 14269”), which was signed by President Trump on April 9, 2025,[6] and the nearly 600 comments received on the Proposed Action. The Action includes four individual Annexes, the formal language of which governs the terms of the Action in the event of a conflict between the Annexes and the other text of the Action,[7] and was published along with a notice of further proposed action calling for additional tariffs on certain China-related ship-to-shore cranes and cargo-handling equipment as directed by President Trump in Executive Order 14269.[8]
Annex I: Service Fee on Chinese Vessel Operators and Vessel Owners of China
Subject to certain exceptions and special rules, Annex I imposes a phased-in fee on Chinese vessel operators operating vessels entering U.S. ports and places, and on operators of vessels owned by “vessel owners of China” entering U.S. ports and places, from outside the Customs territory. The fee is based on the net tonnage of the vessel entering a U.S. port or place and began at US$0 per net ton of the arriving vessel effective April 17, 2025, will increase to US$50 per net ton effective October 14, 2025, and will increase effective April 17 of each year thereafter until April 17, 2028, when it will increase to US$140 per net ton.[9]
The fee can be “charged up to five times per year, per vessel,”[10] and is payable “on or before the entry of a vessel at the first U.S. port or place from outside the Customs territory on a particular string . . . .”[11]
The term “vessel owner of China” is defined broadly in Annex I to include, among others, any entity “owned by, or controlled by, a citizen or citizens of [the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”)], Hong Kong, or Macau,” or “owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of the PRC, Hong Kong, or Macau . . . .”[12] The term “Chinese vessel operators” is not defined, but is probably intended as a reference to “vessel operator of China,” which is defined as any vessel operator, as defined in the Action, that that meets one or more of the same conditions set out in the definition of “vessel owner of China.”[13]
The service fee imposed by Annex I differs from the service fee on Chinese maritime transport operators proposed by the Proposed Action, which would not have been phased-in, would have applied only to vessels operated by then-undefined “vessel operators of China” and not to operators of vessels owned by “vessel owners of China,” would have imposed a significantly higher fee of up to US$1 million or US$1,000 per net ton of capacity for each entrance of a vessel of that operator into a U.S. port, and would not have capped at five the number of times per year that an operator could be charged for the same vessel entering a U.S. port.[14] In choosing to make the fee payable only once for each rotation or string of U.S. ports called if a vessel makes multiple U.S. entries before transiting to a foreign destination,[15] the USTR may have been responding to the concerns of U.S. port operators that had commented that rather than creating an incentive to use more U.S. ships, the Proposed Action would have led to operators consolidating shipments to the U.S., visiting fewer and larger ports, and thereby increasing congestion at larger U.S. ports and threatening the survival of smaller regional U.S. ports.[16]
Critical aspects of Annex I remain to be clarified, and the USTR and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”), which is responsible for collecting the fees, are understood to be working on possible action that would clarify some if not all of the ambiguities in Annex I. For example, Annex I appears to impose a fee on the operators of a vessel entering a U.S. port or place if the vessel is owned by a vessel owner of China and suggests that an entity must be a “vessel owner” before it can be a “vessel owner of China.” The term “vessel owner” is defined in Annex I as “the entity which is identified as the owner of the vessel and whose name would appear on the Vessel Entrance or Clearance Statement (CBP Form 1300) or its electronic equivalent.”[17] Block 8 of CBP Form 1300 available as a .pdf from the CBP website must be completed with the name and country of the owner, but the Form does not indicate whether the owner must be the vessel’s registered owner or demise owner.[18] The most likely conclusion is that Block 8 is to be completed with the name and country of the registered owner. How will this affect the substantial number of owners with vessels that are subject to Chinese leases and call on the United States?[19] It is also not clear how vessel owners that are organized in a jurisdiction other than the PRC, Hong Kong, or Macau, but which are nevertheless vessel owners of China by virtue of being owned or controlled by a citizen or citizens of those jurisdictions, are to report that they are vessel owners of China within the meaning of Annex I. The USTR may clarify these issues and CBP and the USTR are understood to be working on a revised version of CBP Form 1300 that will facilitate compliance with Annex I.
Annex II: Service Fee on Vessel Operators of Chinese-Built Vessels
Subject to certain exceptions and special rules, Annex II imposes a phased-in fee on a vessel operator that is not a “vessel operator of China” but is operating a Chinese-built vessel arriving at a U.S. port or point from outside the Customs territory on a particular string.[20] The fee is the higher of two fees based on the net tonnage of the arriving vessel and the number of containers discharged from the arriving vessel.[21] The fee calculated on the basis of the net tonnage of a vessel began at US$0 per net ton effective April 17, 2025, will increase to US$18 per net ton effective October 14, 2025, and will increase effective April 17 of each year thereafter until April 17, 2028, when it will increase to US$33 per net ton.[22] The fee calculated on the basis of the number of containers discharged from a vessel began at US$0 per container effective April 17, 2025, will increase to US$120 per container effective October 14, 2025, and will increase effective April 17 of each year thereafter until April 17, 2028, when it will increase to US$250 per container.[23]
Much like the fee on Chinese vessel operators operating vessels entering U.S. ports and places, and on operators of vessels owned by “vessel owners of China” entering U.S. ports and places, the fee charged on operators of Chinese-built vessels entering U.S. ports and points can be “charged up to five times per year, per vessel,”[24] and is payable upon the entry of a vessel “to a U.S. port or point from outside the Customs territory on a particular string . . . .”[25]
A Chinese-built vessel is “a vessel that was built in the People’s Republic of China, consistent with the definition of place of build in CBP and U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) regulations and would be so identified on the Vessel Entrance or Clearance Statement (CBP Form 1300) or its electronic equivalent.”[26] The term “container” means “a container as defined in 19 CFR 10.41a, which references the definitions used in the Customs Convention on Containers.”[27]
Unlike the fee on Chinese operators and operators of Chinese-owned vessels, the fee on Chinese-built vessels is subject to remission: The fee on a particular vessel can be suspended for a period not to exceed three years if the vessel owner orders and takes delivery of a U.S.-built vessel of equivalent or greater net tonnage.[28] Owners will be eligible for this remission upon order of, and until delivery of, a U.S.-built vessel.[29] An equivalent non-U.S. built vessel means a vessel with a net tonnage capacity of equal to or less than the U.S.-built vessel ordered.[30] If a prospective vessel owner does not take delivery of the U.S.-built vessel ordered within three years, the fees will become due immediately.[31] The term “U.S.-built vessel” is defined in some detail in the Action.[32]
The fee on operators of Chinese-built vessels is also targeted, meaning it does not apply to certain cargos and vessels. Most significantly, the fee does not apply to U.S. government cargo, U.S.-owned or U.S.-flagged vessels enrolled in the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement, the Maritime Security Program, the Tanker Security Program, or the Cable Security Program, or U.S.-owned vessels where the U.S. entity owning the vessel is controlled by U.S. persons and is at least 75% beneficially owned by U.S. persons.[33] The fee also does not apply to vessels with a capacity of equal to or less than: 4,000 Twenty-Foot Equivalent Units (a unit of measurement for the size of a container), 55,000 deadweight tons, or an individual bulk capacity of 80,000 deadweight tons, or to specialized or special purpose-built vessels for the transport of chemical substances in bulk liquid forms.[34] Other targeted exemptions also apply.[35]
The service fee imposed by Annex II differs from the service fee on maritime transport operators with fleets comprised of Chinese-built vessels or prospective orders for Chinese-built vessels proposed by the Proposed Action, which would not have been phased-in, would have imposed a significantly higher fee of US$1.5 million or an amount based on the percentage of Chinese-built vessels in the operator’s fleet, would have charged an additional fee if the operator had one or more vessels on order or to be delivered from Chinese shipyards, and would not have capped at five the number of times per year that an operator could be charged for the same vessel entering a U.S. port or point.[36] Unlike the proposed fee on maritime transport operators with fleets comprised of Chinese-built vessels or prospective orders for Chinese-built vessels in the Proposed Action, the fee imposed by Annex II is targeted and has exceptions, and is not based on the number of Chinese-built vessels in an operator’s fleet or the percentage of vessels ordered or to be delivered by Chinese shipyards.
Annex II also requires clarification. While Annex II requires a vessel operator to pay a fee on Chinese-built vessels, Annex II also appears to require that the vessel owner must pay all fees for which that entity is liable as determined by CBP.[37] Does the targeted coverage exemption for Chinese-built vessels with “an individual bulk capacity of 80,000 deadweight tons”[38] include only dry bulk carriers or does it include other kinds of vessels? Preliminary indications are that this exemption is meant to apply to all types of vessels and not just dry bulk carriers. A deadweight ton typically refers not only to the weight of cargo that a vessel can carry but also includes the weight of everything else that may be carried onboard a vessel including bunkers (fuel), ballast, crew and water. Does the reference to a “capacity of 80,000 deadweight tons” include the capacity of the vessel to carry more than just cargo? Indications are that the term does include more than just cargo. Paragraph (vi) of the targeted coverage exemptions excludes “specialized or special purpose-built vessels for the transport of chemical substances in bulk liquid forms . . . .”[39] This exemption appears to apply only to carriers of chemical substances, and not to carriers of other products like palm oil, but this too may be clarified.
Annex III: Service Fee on Vessel Operators of Foreign-Built Vehicle Carriers
Annex III imposes a phased-in fee on or before the entry of a non-U.S. built vehicle carrier vessel at the first U.S. port or place from outside the Customs territory.[40] The fee began at US$0 on the entering non-U.S. built vessel as of April 17, 2025, and will increase to US$150 per Car Equivalent Unit (CEU, a unit of measurement for the size of a vehicle) of capacity of the entering non-U.S.-built vessel effective as of October 14, 2025.[41] On June 6, 2025, the USTR proposed changing the fee effective as of October 14, 2025, from US$150 per CEU capacity of the entering non-U.S. built vessel to US$14 per net ton of the arriving non-U.S. built vehicle carrier vessel.[42]
This fee is also subject to remission and can be suspended by ordering U.S.-built vessels much like the remission available to operators of Chinese-built vessels, except that an equivalent non-U.S. built vessel means a vessel with a CEU capacity of equal to or less than the U.S.-built vessel ordered.[43]
The fee imposed by Annex III has no special exemptions, although the modifications proposed on June 6 would create several targeted coverage exemptions, including for “U.S.-owned or U.S.-flagged vessels enrolled in the U.S. Maritime Security Program[,] vessel[s] owned by the U.S. Government and operated directly by the Government or for the Government by an agent or contractor, including . . . privately owned U.S.-flag vessel[s] under bareboat charter to the Government[, and] U.S. government cargo.”[44]
Nothing in Annex III provides that the fee imposed on operators of non-U.S. built vessels will be limited to five times per year, per vessel, and while the Annex provides that the fee is payable on or before the entry of a non-U.S. built vehicle carrier at the first U.S. port of place from outside the Customs territory,[45] there is nothing else in the Annex that would suggest that the fee will be collected only once on a particular string of U.S. calls.
Annex IV: Restriction on Certain Maritime Transport Services
Annex IV requires that, notwithstanding any other provision of law, an increasing annual percentage of LNG exported from the United States on vessels be restricted to vessels that are U.S.-flagged, U.S.-operated and U.S.-built. The restrictions commence on April 17, 2028, from which time 1% of LNG exported by vessel from the United States must be exported on U.S.-flagged and -operated vessels.[46] Commencing on April 17, 2029, 1% of LNG exported by vessel must be exported on U.S.-built, -flagged and -operated vessels.[47] This percentage then increases by 1% or 2% every one, two, or three years until April 17, 2047, on which date the percentage increases and subsequently remains at 15%.[48] The percentages are determined based on the prior calendar year’s total LNG, expressed in cubic feet, that was exported by maritime transport as reported by the U.S. Department of Energy.[49]
Annex IV also provides for remission on orders of U.S.-built vessels similar to the remissions available to operators of Chinese-built vessels pursuant to Annex II and the operators of non-U.S. built vehicle carriers pursuant to Annex III. Annex IV provides additional details on which vessels qualify as U.S.-built for this purpose.[50]
The Action does not detail how or against whom the requirements of Annex IV would be enforced, except to note that if the terms of Annex IV are not met, then the USTR may direct the suspension of LNG export licenses until the terms are met.[51] The Action also does not specify which exporters would have their export licenses suspended if the aggregate of all exports on all carriers fail to meet the requirements of Annex IV. The proposed modifications to Annex IV would delete provisions permitting the USTR to direct the suspension of LNG export licenses for failure to comply with the requirements of Annex IV but do not address how or against whom the requirements of Annex IV would be enforced.[52]
The Proposed Action would have imposed similar requirements on export of all U.S. goods, not just U.S. LNG.[53]
Other Considerations: Fees Not Cumulative, Order of Application and Modifications
The fees and requirements set forth in the Annexes are not cumulative. A vessel is either subject to one of the three fees directed under Annex I, II, or III, or a vessel is subject to the requirements of Annex IV.[54] The Action provides that the fees and requirements it imposes are assessed in the following order: A vessel that is specially designed for the international maritime transport of LNG is subject to Annex IV and is not subject to the fee in Annex I, II, or III.[55] A vessel properly identified as a “Vehicle Carrier” on U.S. Customs and Border Protection Form 1300 will be subject to Annex III. A vessel that meets the conditions of Annex I, e.g., a vessel operated by a Chinese entity or owned by a Chinese entity, will be subject to the fee imposed under Annex I. A vessel may be subject to Annex II when Annexes I and III do not apply.[56]
The Action also noted that the USTR intends to continue to consider actions as to Chinese digital logistics platforms such as the National Transportation and Logistics Public Information Platform (LOGINK) and fees on Chinese-built offshore vessels.[57] The USTR also noted a willingness to consider further modifications to the Action, in connection with which it would consider “the progress of policies under Executive Order 14269 . . . including coordination with allies and partners . . . .” [58]
Proposed Tariffs on China-Linked STS Cranes and Other Cargo-Handling Equipment
In response to a directive in Executive Order 14269, the USTR used the Action to propose duties of up to 100% on ship-to-shore (“STS”) cranes manufactured, assembled, or made using components of Chinese origin, or manufactured anywhere in the world by a company owned, controlled, or substantially influenced by a Chinese national, and additional duties of up to 100% on certain other cargo handling equipment as specified in the Action.[59] The USTR stated that “over-reliance on Chinese production of ship-to-shore cranes and other maritime components and equipment . . . may create opportunities for China to manipulate the supply of critical components or materials essential to U.S. maritime infrastructure.”[60]
Conclusion
The Action represents an improvement over the Proposed Action, both in terms of scope and clarity, but ambiguities remain. Ship operators, ship owners and LNG exporters may expect additional modifications, clarifications, or guidance to the Action from the USTR and CBP, but the timing and extent of these modifications, clarifications, or guidance remain uncertain. Absent some diplomatic agreement, the service fees on Chinese operators of vessels and the operators of Chinese-owned and -built vessels seem here to stay for the foreseeable future and have already become part of the economic and legal landscape of international maritime transportation to and from the United States.[61]
For more information about the Action, the proposed modifications to the Action and any future modifications, clarifications, or guidance regarding the USTR’s port-entry service fees or maritime LNG export requirements, please contact the authors, John F. Imhof Jr. at jimhof@vedderprice.com or +1 212 407 6984, or Jaime L.K. Rosenberg at jrosenberg@vedderprice.com or +1 202 312 3323.
[1] See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, USTR Section 301 Action on China’s Targeting of the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors for Dominance (Apr. 17, 2025) (https://ustr.gov/about/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2025/april/ustr-section-301-action-chinas-targeting-maritime-logistics-and-shipbuilding-sectors-dominance); see also Notice of Action and Proposed Action in Section 301 Investigation of China’s Targeting of the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sections for Dominance; Request for Comments, 90 Fed. Reg. 17114 (Off. U.S. Trade Rep., Apr. 23, 2025) (“Notice of Action”).
[2] 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411(b) and 2414(a).
[3] See Notice of Action at 17115; see also Notice of Determination Pursuant to Section 301: China’s Targeting of the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors for Dominance, 90 Fed. Reg. 8089 (Off. U.S. Trade Rep., Jan. 23, 2025) and Office of the United States Trade Representative, Section 301 Investigation: Report on China’s Targeting of the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors for Dominance (Jan. 16, 2025) (https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/301Investigations/USTRReportChinaTargetingMaritime.pdf) (“Investigation Report”).
[4] See Proposed Action in Section 301 Investigation of China’s Targeting of the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors for Dominance, 90 Fed. Reg. 10843 (Off. U.S. Trade Rep., Feb. 27, 2025).
[5] These comments are available for public review by visiting the USTR’s docket portal at https://comments.ustr.gov/s/docket?docketNumber=USTR-2025-0002.
[6] See Executive Order 14269, Restoring America’s Maritime Dominance, 90 Fed. Reg. 15635 (Apr. 15, 2025).
[7] See Notice of Action, 90 Fed. Reg. 17114, 17116 n.5 (Off. U.S. Trade Rep., Apr. 23, 2025).
[8] See id. at 17116.
[9] See id. at 17122.
[10] Id.
[11] Id.
[12] Id. Paragraph (e) of Annex I provides that “[a] vessel owner of China means any entity: (1) whose country of citizenship is identified as the [PRC], Hong Kong, or Macau on the Vessel Entrance or Clearance Statement or its electronic equivalent; (2) whose headquarters, parent entity’s headquarters, or parent entity’s principal place of business is the PRC, Hong Kong, or Macau; (3) is [sic] owned by, or controlled by, a citizen or citizens of the PRC, Hong Kong, or Macau; (4) is [sic] owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of the PRC, Hong Kong, or Macau[;] (5) is [sic] owned by, or controlled by, an entity listed as a Chinese Military Company pursuant to Section 1260H of the William M. (‘Mac’) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Pub. L. 116‑283); or (6) is [sic] an ocean common carrier, as defined in 46 U.S.C. 40102(7), that is, or whose operating assets are, directly or indirectly, owned or controlled by the government of the PRC or any of its political subdivisions, with ownership or control by a government being deemed to exist for a carrier if: (A) a majority of the interest in the carrier is owned or controlled in any manner by the government of the PRC, an agency of the government of the PRC, or a public or private person controlled by the government of the PRC; or (B) the government of the PRC or any of its political subdivisions has the right to appoint or disapprove the appointment of a majority of the directors, the chief operating officer, or the chief executive officer of the carrier.” Id. An entity is owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of the PRC, Hong Kong, or Macau for the purpose of subparagraph (4) above “where: (A) the entity is a national or resident of the PRC, Hong Kong, or Macau; (B) the entity is organized under the laws of or has its principal place of business in the PRC, Hong Kong, or Macau; (C) 25 percent or more of the entity’s outstanding voting interest, board seats, or equity interest is held directly or indirectly by any combination of the governments of the PRC, Hong Kong, or Macau; [or] (D) 25 percent or more of the entity’s outstanding voting interest, board seats, or equity interest is held directly or indirectly by any combination of the persons who fall within” clauses (A)-(C) above. Id.
[13] See Notice of Action, 90 Fed. Reg. 17114, 17122 (Off. U.S. Trade Rep., Apr. 23, 2025).
[14] See Proposed Action, 90 Fed. Reg. 10843, 10844 (Off. U.S. Trade Rep., Feb. 27, 2025); cf. Notice of Action at 17122.
[15] See Notice of Action at 17122.
[16] See id. at 17117; see also Letter to The Honorable Jamieson Greer, United States Trade Representative, from Cary Davis, President & CEO, American Association of Port Authorities, 1 (USTR-2025-0002-00111439-CAT7-6069-Public Document) (https://comments.ustr.gov/s/commentdetails?rid=XVCVHF3YYV).
[17] Notice of Action, 90 Fed. Reg. 17114, 17122 (Off. U.S. Trade Rep., Apr. 23, 2025).
[18] See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, CBP Form 1300 (05/25), Vessel Entrance or Clearance Statement (https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/2025-06/cbp_form_1300.pdf).
[19] Chinese leases are finance leases in which a Chinese-owned leasing company purchases a vessel from the owner or a shipyard and bareboat charters the vessel to a charterer that does not take title to the vessel but assumes legal responsibility for all of the incidents of ownership, including insuring, manning, supplying, repairing, fueling, maintaining, and operating the vessel. See, e.g., 46 C.F.R. § 169.107.
[20] See Notice of Action at 17122.
[21] See id.
[22] See id.
[23] See id.
[24] Id.
[25] Id.
[26] Notice of Action, 90 Fed. Reg. 17114, 17122 (Off. U.S. Trade Rep., Apr. 23, 2025).
[27] Id.
[28] See id. at 17122-23.
[29] See id. at 17123.
[30] Id.
[31] Id.
[32] See Notice of Action, 90 Fed. Reg. 17114, 17123 (Off. U.S. Trade Rep., Apr. 23, 2025).
[33] See id.
[34] See id.
[35] See id. These exemptions apply to vessels arriving empty or in ballast; vessels entering a U.S. port in the continental United States from a voyage of less than 2,000 nautical miles from a foreign port or point; and vessels identified as “Lakers Vessels” on CBP Form 1300 or its electronic equivalent. See id.
[36] See id.; cf. Proposed Action, 90 Fed. Reg. 10843, 10844-45 (Off. U.S. Trade Rep., Apr. 23, 2025).
[37] See Notice of Action, 90 Fed. Reg. 17114, 17122 (Off. U.S. Trade Rep., Apr. 23, 2025) (Collections, supplemental payments and refunds paras. (a) and (c)).
[38] See id. at 17123.
[39] See id.
[40] See id.
[41] See id.
[42] See Office of the United States Trade Representative, Notice of Proposed Modification of Action in Section 301 Investigation of China’s Targeting the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors for Dominance (June 6, 2025) (https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Releases/2025/301%20Ships%20FRN%20Proposed%20Mod%20Annex%20III%20IV.pdf); see also 90 Fed. Reg. 24856 (Off. U.S. Trade Rep., June 12, 2025) (“Notice of Proposed Modification”).
[43] See Notice of Action, 90 Fed. Reg. 17114, 17123 (Off. U.S. Trade Rep., Apr. 23, 2025).
[44] Notice of Proposed Modification at 24859.
[45] See Notice of Action at 17123.
[46] See id. at 17124.
[47] See id.
[48] See id.
[49] See id.
[50] See id.
[51] See Notice of Action, 90 Fed. Reg. 17114, 17124 (Off. U.S. Trade Rep., Apr. 23, 2025).
[52] See Notice of Proposed Modification, 90 Fed. Reg. 24856, 24860 (Off. U.S. Trade Rep., June 12, 2025).
[53] See Proposed Action, 90 Fed. Reg. 10843, 10845 (Off. U.S. Trade Rep., Feb. 27, 2025).
[54] See Notice of Action at 17121.
[55] See id. at 17121-22.
[56] See id. at 17122.
[57] See id. at 17121. LOGINK is a Chinese state-owned and -controlled logistics data management platform that experts estimate controlled data associated with at least half of global container volume in 2020. See Investigation Report at 17 (citing Gabriel Collins & Jack Bianchi, China’s LOGINK Logistics Platform and Its Strategic Potential for Economic, Political, and Military Power Projection, Baker Institute (Apr. 25, 2023) (https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/chinas-logink-logistics-platform-and-its-strategic-potential-economic-political-and)).
[58] See Notice of Action at 17121.
[59] See id. at 17116.
[60] Id. at 17120.
[61] See, e.g., BIMCO, USTR Clause for Time Charter Parties 2025 (https://www.bimco.org/contractual-affairs/bimco-clauses/current-clauses/ustr-clause/), which is a clause prepared by BIMCO, the largest direct-entry membership organization in the shipping industry, for inclusion in time charter agreements to allocate certain responsibilities in respect of fees incurred pursuant to Annexes I and II between vessel owners and time charterers.
Vedder Thinking | Articles Understanding the U.S. Trade Representative's Port-Entry Fees on China-Linked Vessels
Article
September 9, 2025
On April 17, 2025, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (the “USTR”) published its Section 301 Action on China’s Targeting of the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors for Dominance (the “Action”).[1] The Action is the culmination of the USTR’s year-long investigation, begun under the Biden Administration, and its resulting determination pursuant to Sections 301(b) and 304(a) of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974, as amended (the “Act”),[2] that China’s targeting of the maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors for dominance is unreasonable and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and thus is actionable under Section 301(b) of the Act.[3] That determination led the USTR to publish its proposed action on February 21, 2025 (the “Proposed Action”),[4] and after two days of public hearings and hundreds of written comments,[5] to publish the Action.
The Proposed Action and subsequent public comments were the subject of an article written by the authors that appeared in the April 2025 edition of this Newsletter. A copy of the article may be found by following this link.
With the U.S. port-entry service fees imposed by the Action to begin on October 14, 2025, ship operators and owners are scrambling to understand the Action and its implications, which in many respects remain unclear.
The USTR’s Section 301 Action on China’s Targeting of the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors for Dominance
The USTR’s Action appears to differ significantly from its Proposed Action, perhaps as a result of Executive Order 14269 on “Restoring America’s Maritime Dominance” (“Executive Order 14269”), which was signed by President Trump on April 9, 2025,[6] and the nearly 600 comments received on the Proposed Action. The Action includes four individual Annexes, the formal language of which governs the terms of the Action in the event of a conflict between the Annexes and the other text of the Action,[7] and was published along with a notice of further proposed action calling for additional tariffs on certain China-related ship-to-shore cranes and cargo-handling equipment as directed by President Trump in Executive Order 14269.[8]
Annex I: Service Fee on Chinese Vessel Operators and Vessel Owners of China
Subject to certain exceptions and special rules, Annex I imposes a phased-in fee on Chinese vessel operators operating vessels entering U.S. ports and places, and on operators of vessels owned by “vessel owners of China” entering U.S. ports and places, from outside the Customs territory. The fee is based on the net tonnage of the vessel entering a U.S. port or place and began at US$0 per net ton of the arriving vessel effective April 17, 2025, will increase to US$50 per net ton effective October 14, 2025, and will increase effective April 17 of each year thereafter until April 17, 2028, when it will increase to US$140 per net ton.[9]
The fee can be “charged up to five times per year, per vessel,”[10] and is payable “on or before the entry of a vessel at the first U.S. port or place from outside the Customs territory on a particular string . . . .”[11]
The term “vessel owner of China” is defined broadly in Annex I to include, among others, any entity “owned by, or controlled by, a citizen or citizens of [the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”)], Hong Kong, or Macau,” or “owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of the PRC, Hong Kong, or Macau . . . .”[12] The term “Chinese vessel operators” is not defined, but is probably intended as a reference to “vessel operator of China,” which is defined as any vessel operator, as defined in the Action, that that meets one or more of the same conditions set out in the definition of “vessel owner of China.”[13]
The service fee imposed by Annex I differs from the service fee on Chinese maritime transport operators proposed by the Proposed Action, which would not have been phased-in, would have applied only to vessels operated by then-undefined “vessel operators of China” and not to operators of vessels owned by “vessel owners of China,” would have imposed a significantly higher fee of up to US$1 million or US$1,000 per net ton of capacity for each entrance of a vessel of that operator into a U.S. port, and would not have capped at five the number of times per year that an operator could be charged for the same vessel entering a U.S. port.[14] In choosing to make the fee payable only once for each rotation or string of U.S. ports called if a vessel makes multiple U.S. entries before transiting to a foreign destination,[15] the USTR may have been responding to the concerns of U.S. port operators that had commented that rather than creating an incentive to use more U.S. ships, the Proposed Action would have led to operators consolidating shipments to the U.S., visiting fewer and larger ports, and thereby increasing congestion at larger U.S. ports and threatening the survival of smaller regional U.S. ports.[16]
Critical aspects of Annex I remain to be clarified, and the USTR and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”), which is responsible for collecting the fees, are understood to be working on possible action that would clarify some if not all of the ambiguities in Annex I. For example, Annex I appears to impose a fee on the operators of a vessel entering a U.S. port or place if the vessel is owned by a vessel owner of China and suggests that an entity must be a “vessel owner” before it can be a “vessel owner of China.” The term “vessel owner” is defined in Annex I as “the entity which is identified as the owner of the vessel and whose name would appear on the Vessel Entrance or Clearance Statement (CBP Form 1300) or its electronic equivalent.”[17] Block 8 of CBP Form 1300 available as a .pdf from the CBP website must be completed with the name and country of the owner, but the Form does not indicate whether the owner must be the vessel’s registered owner or demise owner.[18] The most likely conclusion is that Block 8 is to be completed with the name and country of the registered owner. How will this affect the substantial number of owners with vessels that are subject to Chinese leases and call on the United States?[19] It is also not clear how vessel owners that are organized in a jurisdiction other than the PRC, Hong Kong, or Macau, but which are nevertheless vessel owners of China by virtue of being owned or controlled by a citizen or citizens of those jurisdictions, are to report that they are vessel owners of China within the meaning of Annex I. The USTR may clarify these issues and CBP and the USTR are understood to be working on a revised version of CBP Form 1300 that will facilitate compliance with Annex I.
Annex II: Service Fee on Vessel Operators of Chinese-Built Vessels
Subject to certain exceptions and special rules, Annex II imposes a phased-in fee on a vessel operator that is not a “vessel operator of China” but is operating a Chinese-built vessel arriving at a U.S. port or point from outside the Customs territory on a particular string.[20] The fee is the higher of two fees based on the net tonnage of the arriving vessel and the number of containers discharged from the arriving vessel.[21] The fee calculated on the basis of the net tonnage of a vessel began at US$0 per net ton effective April 17, 2025, will increase to US$18 per net ton effective October 14, 2025, and will increase effective April 17 of each year thereafter until April 17, 2028, when it will increase to US$33 per net ton.[22] The fee calculated on the basis of the number of containers discharged from a vessel began at US$0 per container effective April 17, 2025, will increase to US$120 per container effective October 14, 2025, and will increase effective April 17 of each year thereafter until April 17, 2028, when it will increase to US$250 per container.[23]
Much like the fee on Chinese vessel operators operating vessels entering U.S. ports and places, and on operators of vessels owned by “vessel owners of China” entering U.S. ports and places, the fee charged on operators of Chinese-built vessels entering U.S. ports and points can be “charged up to five times per year, per vessel,”[24] and is payable upon the entry of a vessel “to a U.S. port or point from outside the Customs territory on a particular string . . . .”[25]
A Chinese-built vessel is “a vessel that was built in the People’s Republic of China, consistent with the definition of place of build in CBP and U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) regulations and would be so identified on the Vessel Entrance or Clearance Statement (CBP Form 1300) or its electronic equivalent.”[26] The term “container” means “a container as defined in 19 CFR 10.41a, which references the definitions used in the Customs Convention on Containers.”[27]
Unlike the fee on Chinese operators and operators of Chinese-owned vessels, the fee on Chinese-built vessels is subject to remission: The fee on a particular vessel can be suspended for a period not to exceed three years if the vessel owner orders and takes delivery of a U.S.-built vessel of equivalent or greater net tonnage.[28] Owners will be eligible for this remission upon order of, and until delivery of, a U.S.-built vessel.[29] An equivalent non-U.S. built vessel means a vessel with a net tonnage capacity of equal to or less than the U.S.-built vessel ordered.[30] If a prospective vessel owner does not take delivery of the U.S.-built vessel ordered within three years, the fees will become due immediately.[31] The term “U.S.-built vessel” is defined in some detail in the Action.[32]
The fee on operators of Chinese-built vessels is also targeted, meaning it does not apply to certain cargos and vessels. Most significantly, the fee does not apply to U.S. government cargo, U.S.-owned or U.S.-flagged vessels enrolled in the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement, the Maritime Security Program, the Tanker Security Program, or the Cable Security Program, or U.S.-owned vessels where the U.S. entity owning the vessel is controlled by U.S. persons and is at least 75% beneficially owned by U.S. persons.[33] The fee also does not apply to vessels with a capacity of equal to or less than: 4,000 Twenty-Foot Equivalent Units (a unit of measurement for the size of a container), 55,000 deadweight tons, or an individual bulk capacity of 80,000 deadweight tons, or to specialized or special purpose-built vessels for the transport of chemical substances in bulk liquid forms.[34] Other targeted exemptions also apply.[35]
The service fee imposed by Annex II differs from the service fee on maritime transport operators with fleets comprised of Chinese-built vessels or prospective orders for Chinese-built vessels proposed by the Proposed Action, which would not have been phased-in, would have imposed a significantly higher fee of US$1.5 million or an amount based on the percentage of Chinese-built vessels in the operator’s fleet, would have charged an additional fee if the operator had one or more vessels on order or to be delivered from Chinese shipyards, and would not have capped at five the number of times per year that an operator could be charged for the same vessel entering a U.S. port or point.[36] Unlike the proposed fee on maritime transport operators with fleets comprised of Chinese-built vessels or prospective orders for Chinese-built vessels in the Proposed Action, the fee imposed by Annex II is targeted and has exceptions, and is not based on the number of Chinese-built vessels in an operator’s fleet or the percentage of vessels ordered or to be delivered by Chinese shipyards.
Annex II also requires clarification. While Annex II requires a vessel operator to pay a fee on Chinese-built vessels, Annex II also appears to require that the vessel owner must pay all fees for which that entity is liable as determined by CBP.[37] Does the targeted coverage exemption for Chinese-built vessels with “an individual bulk capacity of 80,000 deadweight tons”[38] include only dry bulk carriers or does it include other kinds of vessels? Preliminary indications are that this exemption is meant to apply to all types of vessels and not just dry bulk carriers. A deadweight ton typically refers not only to the weight of cargo that a vessel can carry but also includes the weight of everything else that may be carried onboard a vessel including bunkers (fuel), ballast, crew and water. Does the reference to a “capacity of 80,000 deadweight tons” include the capacity of the vessel to carry more than just cargo? Indications are that the term does include more than just cargo. Paragraph (vi) of the targeted coverage exemptions excludes “specialized or special purpose-built vessels for the transport of chemical substances in bulk liquid forms . . . .”[39] This exemption appears to apply only to carriers of chemical substances, and not to carriers of other products like palm oil, but this too may be clarified.
Annex III: Service Fee on Vessel Operators of Foreign-Built Vehicle Carriers
Annex III imposes a phased-in fee on or before the entry of a non-U.S. built vehicle carrier vessel at the first U.S. port or place from outside the Customs territory.[40] The fee began at US$0 on the entering non-U.S. built vessel as of April 17, 2025, and will increase to US$150 per Car Equivalent Unit (CEU, a unit of measurement for the size of a vehicle) of capacity of the entering non-U.S.-built vessel effective as of October 14, 2025.[41] On June 6, 2025, the USTR proposed changing the fee effective as of October 14, 2025, from US$150 per CEU capacity of the entering non-U.S. built vessel to US$14 per net ton of the arriving non-U.S. built vehicle carrier vessel.[42]
This fee is also subject to remission and can be suspended by ordering U.S.-built vessels much like the remission available to operators of Chinese-built vessels, except that an equivalent non-U.S. built vessel means a vessel with a CEU capacity of equal to or less than the U.S.-built vessel ordered.[43]
The fee imposed by Annex III has no special exemptions, although the modifications proposed on June 6 would create several targeted coverage exemptions, including for “U.S.-owned or U.S.-flagged vessels enrolled in the U.S. Maritime Security Program[,] vessel[s] owned by the U.S. Government and operated directly by the Government or for the Government by an agent or contractor, including . . . privately owned U.S.-flag vessel[s] under bareboat charter to the Government[, and] U.S. government cargo.”[44]
Nothing in Annex III provides that the fee imposed on operators of non-U.S. built vessels will be limited to five times per year, per vessel, and while the Annex provides that the fee is payable on or before the entry of a non-U.S. built vehicle carrier at the first U.S. port of place from outside the Customs territory,[45] there is nothing else in the Annex that would suggest that the fee will be collected only once on a particular string of U.S. calls.
Annex IV: Restriction on Certain Maritime Transport Services
Annex IV requires that, notwithstanding any other provision of law, an increasing annual percentage of LNG exported from the United States on vessels be restricted to vessels that are U.S.-flagged, U.S.-operated and U.S.-built. The restrictions commence on April 17, 2028, from which time 1% of LNG exported by vessel from the United States must be exported on U.S.-flagged and -operated vessels.[46] Commencing on April 17, 2029, 1% of LNG exported by vessel must be exported on U.S.-built, -flagged and -operated vessels.[47] This percentage then increases by 1% or 2% every one, two, or three years until April 17, 2047, on which date the percentage increases and subsequently remains at 15%.[48] The percentages are determined based on the prior calendar year’s total LNG, expressed in cubic feet, that was exported by maritime transport as reported by the U.S. Department of Energy.[49]
Annex IV also provides for remission on orders of U.S.-built vessels similar to the remissions available to operators of Chinese-built vessels pursuant to Annex II and the operators of non-U.S. built vehicle carriers pursuant to Annex III. Annex IV provides additional details on which vessels qualify as U.S.-built for this purpose.[50]
The Action does not detail how or against whom the requirements of Annex IV would be enforced, except to note that if the terms of Annex IV are not met, then the USTR may direct the suspension of LNG export licenses until the terms are met.[51] The Action also does not specify which exporters would have their export licenses suspended if the aggregate of all exports on all carriers fail to meet the requirements of Annex IV. The proposed modifications to Annex IV would delete provisions permitting the USTR to direct the suspension of LNG export licenses for failure to comply with the requirements of Annex IV but do not address how or against whom the requirements of Annex IV would be enforced.[52]
The Proposed Action would have imposed similar requirements on export of all U.S. goods, not just U.S. LNG.[53]
Other Considerations: Fees Not Cumulative, Order of Application and Modifications
The fees and requirements set forth in the Annexes are not cumulative. A vessel is either subject to one of the three fees directed under Annex I, II, or III, or a vessel is subject to the requirements of Annex IV.[54] The Action provides that the fees and requirements it imposes are assessed in the following order: A vessel that is specially designed for the international maritime transport of LNG is subject to Annex IV and is not subject to the fee in Annex I, II, or III.[55] A vessel properly identified as a “Vehicle Carrier” on U.S. Customs and Border Protection Form 1300 will be subject to Annex III. A vessel that meets the conditions of Annex I, e.g., a vessel operated by a Chinese entity or owned by a Chinese entity, will be subject to the fee imposed under Annex I. A vessel may be subject to Annex II when Annexes I and III do not apply.[56]
The Action also noted that the USTR intends to continue to consider actions as to Chinese digital logistics platforms such as the National Transportation and Logistics Public Information Platform (LOGINK) and fees on Chinese-built offshore vessels.[57] The USTR also noted a willingness to consider further modifications to the Action, in connection with which it would consider “the progress of policies under Executive Order 14269 . . . including coordination with allies and partners . . . .” [58]
Proposed Tariffs on China-Linked STS Cranes and Other Cargo-Handling Equipment
In response to a directive in Executive Order 14269, the USTR used the Action to propose duties of up to 100% on ship-to-shore (“STS”) cranes manufactured, assembled, or made using components of Chinese origin, or manufactured anywhere in the world by a company owned, controlled, or substantially influenced by a Chinese national, and additional duties of up to 100% on certain other cargo handling equipment as specified in the Action.[59] The USTR stated that “over-reliance on Chinese production of ship-to-shore cranes and other maritime components and equipment . . . may create opportunities for China to manipulate the supply of critical components or materials essential to U.S. maritime infrastructure.”[60]
Conclusion
The Action represents an improvement over the Proposed Action, both in terms of scope and clarity, but ambiguities remain. Ship operators, ship owners and LNG exporters may expect additional modifications, clarifications, or guidance to the Action from the USTR and CBP, but the timing and extent of these modifications, clarifications, or guidance remain uncertain. Absent some diplomatic agreement, the service fees on Chinese operators of vessels and the operators of Chinese-owned and -built vessels seem here to stay for the foreseeable future and have already become part of the economic and legal landscape of international maritime transportation to and from the United States.[61]
For more information about the Action, the proposed modifications to the Action and any future modifications, clarifications, or guidance regarding the USTR’s port-entry service fees or maritime LNG export requirements, please contact the authors, John F. Imhof Jr. at jimhof@vedderprice.com or +1 212 407 6984, or Jaime L.K. Rosenberg at jrosenberg@vedderprice.com or +1 202 312 3323.
[1] See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, USTR Section 301 Action on China’s Targeting of the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors for Dominance (Apr. 17, 2025) (https://ustr.gov/about/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2025/april/ustr-section-301-action-chinas-targeting-maritime-logistics-and-shipbuilding-sectors-dominance); see also Notice of Action and Proposed Action in Section 301 Investigation of China’s Targeting of the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sections for Dominance; Request for Comments, 90 Fed. Reg. 17114 (Off. U.S. Trade Rep., Apr. 23, 2025) (“Notice of Action”).
[2] 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411(b) and 2414(a).
[3] See Notice of Action at 17115; see also Notice of Determination Pursuant to Section 301: China’s Targeting of the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors for Dominance, 90 Fed. Reg. 8089 (Off. U.S. Trade Rep., Jan. 23, 2025) and Office of the United States Trade Representative, Section 301 Investigation: Report on China’s Targeting of the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors for Dominance (Jan. 16, 2025) (https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/301Investigations/USTRReportChinaTargetingMaritime.pdf) (“Investigation Report”).
[4] See Proposed Action in Section 301 Investigation of China’s Targeting of the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors for Dominance, 90 Fed. Reg. 10843 (Off. U.S. Trade Rep., Feb. 27, 2025).
[5] These comments are available for public review by visiting the USTR’s docket portal at https://comments.ustr.gov/s/docket?docketNumber=USTR-2025-0002.
[6] See Executive Order 14269, Restoring America’s Maritime Dominance, 90 Fed. Reg. 15635 (Apr. 15, 2025).
[7] See Notice of Action, 90 Fed. Reg. 17114, 17116 n.5 (Off. U.S. Trade Rep., Apr. 23, 2025).
[8] See id. at 17116.
[9] See id. at 17122.
[10] Id.
[11] Id.
[12] Id. Paragraph (e) of Annex I provides that “[a] vessel owner of China means any entity: (1) whose country of citizenship is identified as the [PRC], Hong Kong, or Macau on the Vessel Entrance or Clearance Statement or its electronic equivalent; (2) whose headquarters, parent entity’s headquarters, or parent entity’s principal place of business is the PRC, Hong Kong, or Macau; (3) is [sic] owned by, or controlled by, a citizen or citizens of the PRC, Hong Kong, or Macau; (4) is [sic] owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of the PRC, Hong Kong, or Macau[;] (5) is [sic] owned by, or controlled by, an entity listed as a Chinese Military Company pursuant to Section 1260H of the William M. (‘Mac’) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Pub. L. 116‑283); or (6) is [sic] an ocean common carrier, as defined in 46 U.S.C. 40102(7), that is, or whose operating assets are, directly or indirectly, owned or controlled by the government of the PRC or any of its political subdivisions, with ownership or control by a government being deemed to exist for a carrier if: (A) a majority of the interest in the carrier is owned or controlled in any manner by the government of the PRC, an agency of the government of the PRC, or a public or private person controlled by the government of the PRC; or (B) the government of the PRC or any of its political subdivisions has the right to appoint or disapprove the appointment of a majority of the directors, the chief operating officer, or the chief executive officer of the carrier.” Id. An entity is owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of the PRC, Hong Kong, or Macau for the purpose of subparagraph (4) above “where: (A) the entity is a national or resident of the PRC, Hong Kong, or Macau; (B) the entity is organized under the laws of or has its principal place of business in the PRC, Hong Kong, or Macau; (C) 25 percent or more of the entity’s outstanding voting interest, board seats, or equity interest is held directly or indirectly by any combination of the governments of the PRC, Hong Kong, or Macau; [or] (D) 25 percent or more of the entity’s outstanding voting interest, board seats, or equity interest is held directly or indirectly by any combination of the persons who fall within” clauses (A)-(C) above. Id.
[13] See Notice of Action, 90 Fed. Reg. 17114, 17122 (Off. U.S. Trade Rep., Apr. 23, 2025).
[14] See Proposed Action, 90 Fed. Reg. 10843, 10844 (Off. U.S. Trade Rep., Feb. 27, 2025); cf. Notice of Action at 17122.
[15] See Notice of Action at 17122.
[16] See id. at 17117; see also Letter to The Honorable Jamieson Greer, United States Trade Representative, from Cary Davis, President & CEO, American Association of Port Authorities, 1 (USTR-2025-0002-00111439-CAT7-6069-Public Document) (https://comments.ustr.gov/s/commentdetails?rid=XVCVHF3YYV).
[17] Notice of Action, 90 Fed. Reg. 17114, 17122 (Off. U.S. Trade Rep., Apr. 23, 2025).
[18] See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, CBP Form 1300 (05/25), Vessel Entrance or Clearance Statement (https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/2025-06/cbp_form_1300.pdf).
[19] Chinese leases are finance leases in which a Chinese-owned leasing company purchases a vessel from the owner or a shipyard and bareboat charters the vessel to a charterer that does not take title to the vessel but assumes legal responsibility for all of the incidents of ownership, including insuring, manning, supplying, repairing, fueling, maintaining, and operating the vessel. See, e.g., 46 C.F.R. § 169.107.
[20] See Notice of Action at 17122.
[21] See id.
[22] See id.
[23] See id.
[24] Id.
[25] Id.
[26] Notice of Action, 90 Fed. Reg. 17114, 17122 (Off. U.S. Trade Rep., Apr. 23, 2025).
[27] Id.
[28] See id. at 17122-23.
[29] See id. at 17123.
[30] Id.
[31] Id.
[32] See Notice of Action, 90 Fed. Reg. 17114, 17123 (Off. U.S. Trade Rep., Apr. 23, 2025).
[33] See id.
[34] See id.
[35] See id. These exemptions apply to vessels arriving empty or in ballast; vessels entering a U.S. port in the continental United States from a voyage of less than 2,000 nautical miles from a foreign port or point; and vessels identified as “Lakers Vessels” on CBP Form 1300 or its electronic equivalent. See id.
[36] See id.; cf. Proposed Action, 90 Fed. Reg. 10843, 10844-45 (Off. U.S. Trade Rep., Apr. 23, 2025).
[37] See Notice of Action, 90 Fed. Reg. 17114, 17122 (Off. U.S. Trade Rep., Apr. 23, 2025) (Collections, supplemental payments and refunds paras. (a) and (c)).
[38] See id. at 17123.
[39] See id.
[40] See id.
[41] See id.
[42] See Office of the United States Trade Representative, Notice of Proposed Modification of Action in Section 301 Investigation of China’s Targeting the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors for Dominance (June 6, 2025) (https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Releases/2025/301%20Ships%20FRN%20Proposed%20Mod%20Annex%20III%20IV.pdf); see also 90 Fed. Reg. 24856 (Off. U.S. Trade Rep., June 12, 2025) (“Notice of Proposed Modification”).
[43] See Notice of Action, 90 Fed. Reg. 17114, 17123 (Off. U.S. Trade Rep., Apr. 23, 2025).
[44] Notice of Proposed Modification at 24859.
[45] See Notice of Action at 17123.
[46] See id. at 17124.
[47] See id.
[48] See id.
[49] See id.
[50] See id.
[51] See Notice of Action, 90 Fed. Reg. 17114, 17124 (Off. U.S. Trade Rep., Apr. 23, 2025).
[52] See Notice of Proposed Modification, 90 Fed. Reg. 24856, 24860 (Off. U.S. Trade Rep., June 12, 2025).
[53] See Proposed Action, 90 Fed. Reg. 10843, 10845 (Off. U.S. Trade Rep., Feb. 27, 2025).
[54] See Notice of Action at 17121.
[55] See id. at 17121-22.
[56] See id. at 17122.
[57] See id. at 17121. LOGINK is a Chinese state-owned and -controlled logistics data management platform that experts estimate controlled data associated with at least half of global container volume in 2020. See Investigation Report at 17 (citing Gabriel Collins & Jack Bianchi, China’s LOGINK Logistics Platform and Its Strategic Potential for Economic, Political, and Military Power Projection, Baker Institute (Apr. 25, 2023) (https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/chinas-logink-logistics-platform-and-its-strategic-potential-economic-political-and)).
[58] See Notice of Action at 17121.
[59] See id. at 17116.
[60] Id. at 17120.
[61] See, e.g., BIMCO, USTR Clause for Time Charter Parties 2025 (https://www.bimco.org/contractual-affairs/bimco-clauses/current-clauses/ustr-clause/), which is a clause prepared by BIMCO, the largest direct-entry membership organization in the shipping industry, for inclusion in time charter agreements to allocate certain responsibilities in respect of fees incurred pursuant to Annexes I and II between vessel owners and time charterers.
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